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Comments and Casenotes
Dual Nature Contracts And The Uniform Commercial Code
Foster v. Colorado Radio Corporation1
Defendant contracted to purchase the assets of plaintiff's radio
station, which included license, good will, real estate, studios and fur-
nishings. Upon defendant's default, plaintiff sold to a third party for
a lower price and brought an action against defendant for the differ-
ence. The defendant contended, inter alia, that she was not liable
because of the plaintiff's failure to give her notice of this sale in accord-
ance with Section 2-706(3)2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The
district court held that the Code was not applicable since only the
furnishings, the value of which constituted between five and ten per
cent of the contract price were "goods" within the meaning of the
Code.' These "goods" were incidental to the contract's main purpose,
the conveyance of assets not covered by the Code. Consequently, the
court found for the plaintiff and awarded as damages the difference
between the contract price and resale price. On appeal, the court of
appeals held that the plaintiff could not recover the value of the
furnishings and reduced damages accordingly. Observing that the
furnishings were easily identifiable and that their value was both con-
siderable and readily ascertainable,4 the court held that Article 2 of
the Code should be applied to them even though they were only a
small part of a sale involving assets not covered by the Code. The court
interpreted the language of Section 2-102 of the Code to include the
sale of all goods falling within the definition of "goods" contained in
Section 2-105, regardless of whether the goods were sold under a
contract with property to which the definition did not apply.5
To reach this result, the appellate court was forced to divide the
original contract, placing only part of it within the ambit of the Code.
It should be noted at the outset that the Foster case involved a unified
contract for existing goods. Where the contract is divisible,6 it can
1. 381 F.2d 222 (10th Cir. 1967).
2. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODA § 2-706(3) provides that "[wihere the resale
is at private sale the seller must give the buyer reasonable notification of his intention
to resell."
3. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODA § 2-105(1): "'Goods' means all things (including
specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the
contract other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities(Article 8) and things in action."
4. The amount involved was between $12,500 and $25,000.
5. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL COn § 2-102 states: "Unless the context otherwise
requires, this Article applies to transactions in goods; it does not apply to any transac-
tion which although in the form of an unconditional contract to sell or present sale
is intended to operate only as a security transaction nor does this Article impair or
repeal any statute regulating sales to consumers, farmers or other specified classes
of buyers."
6. See notes 43-45 infra and accompanying text. Although the appellate court
divided the contract for the purpose of reducing damages, neither the parties nor the
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be treated without logical difficulty as two separate agreements with
different law applicable to each. There are few cases which deal with
the problem of whether to apply two bodies of law to a unified agree-
ment for existing goods, but the available decisions suggest varying
approaches, each of which may be appropriate in certain contexts.
The problem presented by the dual nature of unified sales con-
tracts predates the Code; the courts had previously encountered the
problem in an analogous context, that of the mixed sales-service con-
tract. A typical situation would be one in which X contracts with Y
to perform certain services involving a transfer of goods from X to Y
as a part of the transaction. The goods are defective, and Y brings an
action for breach of implied warranty. Traditionally, the court would
then decide the vexatious question of whether the contract should be
considered as a sale of goods, in which case a warranty would be im-
plied, or as a service contract, in which case no implied warranty would
arise. The majority of the courts would follow the holding of the
district court in Foster and look to the "essence" or main object of
the contract and then characterize the entire contract accordingly.7
A recurrent situation in the sales-service area is the "bad blood"
case' in which the plaintiff is injured by faulty blood administered to
him in the course of hospital treatments and sues on a warranty
theory. In the first and most influential bad blood case, Perlmutter
v. Beth David Hospital,9 a strong three-judge dissent favored the
severance of the contract, but the majority ruled that: "[W]hen service
predominates, and transfer of personal property is but an incidental
feature of the transaction, the transaction is not deemed a sale within
the Sales Act."1 The passage of the Uniform Commercial Code has
had only a limited effect on the resolution of the "bad blood" cases.
The majority of the courts have stood fast to Perlmutter, maintaining
that the provision of a service was the main purpose of the contract."
court contended that the contract involved here was a severable contract as opposed to
an entire or unitary contract.
7. Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 CoLum.
L. Rxv. 653 (1957). There are three basic theories used in the service-sale area which
were originally formulated for the purpose of determining whether the Statute of
Frauds applied to the contract. The Massachusetts rule characterizes contracts for
goods to be made on order which are not part of the seller's stock in trade as con-
tracts for services. Goddard v. Binney, 115 Mass. 450 (1874). Under the old New
York rule, if the contract is for goods manufactured in the future, it is viewed as a
contract for services. Crookshand v. Burrell, 18 Johns. 58 (N.Y. 1820). The old
English rule looked to whether the services or materials supplied were the "essence"
of the contract. Clay v. Yates, 1 H.&N. 73, 156 Eng. Rep. 1123 (1856).
The New York and Massachusetts rules are not suitable for cases not in-
volving sales-service contracts where the goods are in existence. See generally Farns-
worth, supra note 7; Comment, Sales, Distinguished from other Distribution Trans-
actions, 1960 Wis. L. Rgv. 294; Note, "Sale of Goods" or "Work, Labor and
Materials" - What is the Distinction?, 43 IOWA L. Rlv. 95 (1957) ; 1 S. WILLISTON,
SAas §§ 54-55 (1948).
8. E.g., Gile v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist., 48 Wash. 2d 774, 296 P.2d
662 (1956); Sloneker v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 233 F. Supp. 105 (D. Colo. 1964);
Note, Sales and Service Warranties in Blood Transfusions, 26 MD. L. Rnv. 182(1966); Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 761, 777 (1958).
9. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
10. Id. at 104, 123 N.E.2d at 794.
11. Dorfman v. Austenal, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966); Cutler v.
General Electric Co., 4 U.C.C. Rep. 300 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967) (holding that the
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However, in 1967, a New Jersey intermediate court decision, Jackson
v. Muhlenberg Hospital,2 held that when the hospital provided a
transfusion in the course of treatment, a sale within the scope of
Article 2 had occurred. The court, in denying defendant's motion for
summary judgment, decided further that although all implied war-
ranties had been "reasonably" disclaimed, the plaintiff might contend
that an express warranty printed on the bottle, that the "utmost care"
had been used in the selection of donors, had been breached. How-
ever, had the disclaimer not been present, it is apparent that the court
would not have subjected the hospital to strict liability based on an
implied warranty of merchantability. The court felt that neither public
policy nor the facts of the case would justify that result. 3 In another
recent decision, a Florida district appellate court held, in a suit against
a blood bank, that a sale had occurred and, thus, that an implied war-
ranty attached.' 4 The court narrowed its holding by stating that the
plaintiff could recover only if he showed that his injuries were caused
by a failure to detect or remove a deleterious substance in the blood
which was capable of detection or removal. 5 In reaching its con-
clusion, the court specifically rejected the "essence" theory and came to
grips with the basic policy question which controls the bad blood cases:
[A] lthough many of the decisions denying recovery for breach of
implied warranty are based on the technical distinction between
a service and a sale, the factor underlying the decisions is the in-
ability, in the present state of medical knowledge, to detect or
remove the virus which causes serum hepatitis. It is often stated
that it would be against public policy to impose strict warranty
liability, for an undetectable unremovable defect, against a non-
commercial organization which was supplying a commodity essen-
tial for medical treatment.' 6
Other courts have stressed the fact that blood suppliers are not com-
mercial competitors advertising the superiority of their product and
that the patient's only real reliance is on the judgment of the attending
physician.'7
securing of a "Pacemaker" machine was "a secondary adjunct to the service per-
formed") ; Lovett v. Emory University, Inc., 116 Ga. App. 277, 156 S.E.2d 923 (1967).
12. 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (L. Div. 1967).
13. The court's discussion of the policy grounds centered mostly around strict tortliability. The court indicated that the same reasoning would preclude recovery onimplied warranty theory. The policy grounds were fundamentally the same as those
discussed in Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla. App. 1966),
aff'd, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967).
14. Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla. App. 1966),
aff'd, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967). Courts have previously rejected a distinction
between a blood bank and a hospital. E.g., Whitehurst v. American National Red
Cross, 402 P.2d 584 (Ariz. 1965); Balkswitsch v. Minnesota War Memorial Blood
Bank, Inc., 270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965).15. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 402A, comment k (1938). The court indicated
that it viewed blood as an "unavoidably unsafe product" under the Restatement
definition, but no medical evidence on this question had been presented in the record.
16. 185 So. 2d at 752. See also Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective
Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363, 367-68 (1965).
17. Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hospital, 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (1967).
See generally Note, Sales and Service Warranties in Blood Transfusions, 26 MD. L.
Rxv. 182 (1966).
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Because of the special factors which support a policy favoring
blood suppliers, the bad blood cases should not be regarded as per-
suasive authority in analogous situations. However, the "essence"
rationale relied on in the bad blood cases has been used to bar warranty
recovery in widely differing areas.' A Connecticut case, Epstein
v. Giannattasio,'9 is one of the few reported sales-service cases to
apply the "essence" theory under the Code. In Epstein, the plaintiff
was injured when products used during a beauty treatment caused
injury. In denying recovery on a warranty theory the court stressed
the incidental nature of any sale of products attending the treatment
and viewed the situation as closely analogous to Connecticut precedents
dealing with the sale of food in restaurants.2 0 The case may be dis-
tinguishable in most jurisdictions since the Connecticut restaurant
cases represent a minority position.2 ' However, dictum in a Pennsyl-
vania lower court decision indicates that the court might use the
''essence" or main object theory in determining whether to imply a
warranty in a sales-service contract.22
The "essence" test has also been used to determine whether or
not the Statute of Frauds in Article 221 should apply to a sales-service
contract. In National Historic Shrines Foundation, Inc. v. Dali,"4
decided under the Code, the court held that an oral contract to paint a
picture and donate it to the public was in essence a service contract
and, therefore, not required to be evidenced by a writing to be enforce-
able. The court, however, in disallowing a motion for summary
judgment, gave the plaintiff an opportunity to demonstrate the exist-
ence of the entire contract, not merely the service element.
Foster, which illustrates a second approach to the dual nature
contract, is the first case to deal with a contract covering both Code
and non-Code property, although dictum in a recent Georgia case2"
indicates that the Georgia court would not apply the Code to a sale
of both movables and non-movables unless the sale of the non-movables
was incidental to the sale of the movable goods covered by the Code.
The court in Foster did not choose to limit the application of the Code
in this manner. Accordingly, it distinguished Epstein on its facts, since
the strict holding of that case dealt with a sales-service contract.
However, contrary to the position taken by the Epstein court, the
Foster court gave a broad reading to Section 2-102, viewing it as
extending the scope of Article 2 to the sale of all goods within the
18. E.g., Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal. 2d 573, 360 P.2d 897
(1961) (contract to furnish necessary material and labor for installation of a heating
system was a contract for services); Lynch v. Hotel Bond Co., 117 Conn. 128, 167
A. 99 (1933) (purchase of food in a restaurant held a service) ; Stammer v. Mulvaney,
264 Wis. 244, 58 N.W.2d 671 (1953) (purchase and installation of a septic tank is
a contract for services).
19. 25 Conn. Sup. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (C.P. 1963).
20. E.g., Lynch v. Hotel Bond Co., 117 Conn. 128, 167 A. 99 (1933).
21. See generally Annot., 7 A.L.R.2d 1028 (1949).
22. Victor v. Barzaleski, 19 Pa. D. & C.2d 698 (C.P. Luzerne County 1959).
23. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-207.
24. 4 U.C.C. Rep. 71 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967).
25. Lunsford v. Wilson, 113 Ga. App. 602, 149 S.E.2d 515 (1966). But cf.
Ahern v. Nudelman, 374 Ill. 237, 29 N.E.2d 268 (1940) (pre-Code case partitioning a




section's definition, regardless of whether the sale of those goods was
an incidental or predominant part of the entire transaction.
The existence of a third approach has been indicated by the
commentators and by several recent cases. The commentators have
argued that the Code should have the broadest possible application
and that the policies embodied in the Code should be applicable to
subject matter not expressly included within its purview if the prob-
lem is sufficiently analogous to one contemplated by the Code.26 This
argument, based on the theory that the Code represents today's most
progressive thought in commercial law, asserts that where a case falls
in an area where there is a "gap" in the Code's coverage, outside law
should not be applied if it is inconsistent with Code policies. This line
of reasoning has been adopted in several recent cases. In Stern &
Company v. State Loan and Finance Corporation,7 the Delaware
district court applied the parol evidence rule of Article 228 to a con-
tract involving investment securities. Although investment securities
are excluded from Article 2 by Section 2-105, the court relied on the
comments to that section which state that such exclusion is not in-
tended to prevent the application by analogy of a section of the Article
to securities when the application is sensible and the situation is not
covered by Article 8.9 In Vitex Manufacturing Corporation v. Carib-
tex Corporation,"° the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, when
faced with conflicting lines of authority, found the Code persuasive in
including overhead as damages for breach of a service contract:
Significantly, the Uniform Commercial Code . . .provides
for the recovery of overhead in circumstances similar to those
presented here [citing 2-708]. . . . While this contract is not
controlled by the Code, the Code is persuasive here because it
embodies the foremost modern legal thought concerning com-
mercial transactions."'
Similar use of the Code was made in Transatlantic Financing Corpora-
tion v. United States.12 Although the subject matter of that case in-
26. Franklin, On the Legal Method of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW
& CONUTMP. PROB. 330 (1951); Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code" Mythology,
1962 ILL. L.F. 291; Note, The Uniform Commercial Code as a Premise for Judicial
Reasoning, 65 COLUM. L. R~v. 880 (1965); see also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 1-102, Comment 1, which states:
Courts have been careful to keep broad acts from being hampered in their effects
by later acts of limited scope [citation omitted]. They have recognized the
policies embodied in an act as applicable in reason to subject-matter which was
not expressly included in the language of the act [citation omitted]. They have
done the same where reason and policy so required, even where the subject-
matter had been intentionally excluded from the act in general .... Nothing in
this Act stands in the way of continuance of such action by the courts.
27. 238 F. Supp. 901 (D. Del. 1965). See also Hunt Foods & Indus. v. Dolner,
49 Misc. 2d 246, 267 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1966), rev'd on other grounds, 26 A.D.2d 41,
270 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1966).
28. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202.
29. 238 F. Supp. at 911 n.2.
30. 377 F.2d 795 (3rd Cir. 1967).
31. Id. at 799.
32. 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See also Berk v. Gordon-Johnson Co., 232
F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1964), where the defendant sold processing machinery
which proved unfit for the Kosher slaughtering of poultry. Plaintiff-buyer contended
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volved the duty of a carrier, rather than the sale of goods, and in spite
of the fact that the transaction occurred well before the Code was
generally accepted, the court looked to Sections 2-614(1 ) and 2- 6 15 (a)
of the Code to determine a standard for impossibility of performance.
Three methods have been suggested for dealing with a contract
the subject matter of which is covered only partially by the Code: the
"essence" theory applied by Epstein, the contract splitting device utilized
by Foster, and the analogy theory suggested by Vitex. Which method
will be applied in any given case would seem to depend on two factors:
the nature of the contract and the issues involved.
The "essence" test will probably be applied by most courts, as it
has been in the past,3 3 to sales-service contracts where the issue is
whether to imply a warranty to the sales portion of the contract.
Despite the modern trend toward strict liability,34 it has been the
almost universal rule in American jurisdictions that no implied war-
ranties attach to a service contract.85 The argument has been made
that the policies behind the imposition of implied warranties should
require them to be imposed wherever there is an element of sale ;6 the
Jackson37 case endorses this theory. However, in cases such as Epstein,
the courts will no doubt continue to resist this theory because of the
danger that a warranty on the "sales" portion will operate, in effect,
as a service warranty, since it is often unclear whether the injury
results from the services or from the goods used in connection with
the services."8 Moreover, it is conceptually difficult to view an agree-
ment, such as that in Epstein, as a contract for the sale of goods where
such is not the intent of the parties and where the seller does not
specifically realize a profit on the "transfer" of goods but profits only
from the services rendered. Such goods appear more similar in nature
to tools of a particular trade than to goods which pass from a seller
to a buyer for a consideration. To avoid this latter difficulty, it has
that a sketch of the machine labelled "Kosher operation" constituted an express
warranty despite the presence of a disclaimer clause within the sales contract. The
court, in rejecting defendant's motion for summary judgment, held that the language
of the disclaimer need not be construed as nullifying an express warranty. The court
used the 1952 version of the Code, not then applicable in Michigan, as "a further aid
to the interpretation of contracts in which there is conflict in the language as to the
existence of an express warranty." 232 F. Supp. at 688. But cf. In re Advance Print-
ing & Litho Co., 4 U.C.C. Rep. 838, 842 (3rd Cir. 1967) ("Unconscionability" clause,
Section 2-302, does not apply to secured transactions even though, quoting from the
opinion below, "the result here appears inequitable and unconscionable . . .").
33. Comment, Contracts For Services Distinguished from Those to Sell Goods,
i5 FORDHAM L. Rxv. 92 (1946).
34. E.g., Cirrtrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212
A.2d 769 (1965).
35. Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 CoLuM.
L. RZv. 653 (1957).
36. Id.; Note, Contract Formation and the Law of Warranty: A Broader Use
of the Code, 8 B.C. IND. & COM. L. Riv. 81 (1967).
37. Note 11 supra and accompanying text.
38. Cf. Voight v. Ott, 86 Ariz. 128, 341 P.2d 923 (1959). Defendant faultily con-
verted a heating and cooling system over to refrigeration, causing permanent damage
to the unit The court's discussion was directed to the issue of whether the defendant's
sale of the unit was a sale of goods to which the Uniform Sales Act applied, or
whether the unit was a fixture to which no warranty attached. However, it appears
from the opinion that defendant's faulty servicing of the unit may have been the real
proximate cause of the damage to the unit.
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been contended that the English approach of warranting any goods
furnished, whether or not there has been a "sale," is the better view ;39
some courts may be disposed to adopt this position even in the Epstein
situation.4" This argument is reinforced by the fact that in admiralty
law an implied warranty has been attached without apparent difficulty
both to the services rendered and to the equipment used by a stevedor-
ing contractor.4 ' These considerations may have some merit in the
Epstein situation, but they would not be persuasive in cases where the
goods are likely to have substantial value and are relatively complete
in themselves, even though services are needed to make them fully
effective for the buyer's purpose. In the installation contract situation,
for example, it is more likely, because of the importance of the goods,
that the parties view the transaction, at least in part, as a sale, that
the servicer is profiting on the price for which he buys and for which
he sells the goods, and that the alleged injury will be more easily
traceable to a defect in the goods themselves. In such a situation the
courts have applied the "essence" theory.42
The "essence" test seems most appropriate to the sales-service
contract when the issue is the applicability of the Statute of Frauds
to the "sales" portion of the contract. Traditionally, the Statute of
Frauds has differentiated between entire and divisible contracts.43 For
the purpose of the statute, an entire contract is a contract in which
the elements of one party's performance obligation, taken together, form
a unit, or are all directed to the accomplishment of a single purpose.
Typically, the consideration for such a contract is in the form of a
fixed sum which is not allocated to the individual goods covered by
the contract. Foster is an example of such a contract. A divisible
contract is one in which one party's various performance obligations
are not intrinsically related and separate consideration is received for
each distinct performance. A divisible contract thus consists of two
or more individual, independent contracts. Generally, where any part
of an entire contract fails to satisfy the requirements of the Statute
of Frauds, the whole contract is unenforceable44 on the theory that if
39. Farnsworth, supra note 35, at 664-65.
40. Cf. Cirrtrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212
A.2d 769 (1965) (implying a warranty to a lease on the ground that it was "analogous"
to a sale).
41. Italia Societa per Azioni Di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376
U.S. 315 (1964); Thompson v. Trent Maritime Co., 353 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1965).
42. Comment, Contracts for Services Distinguished from Those to Sell Goods,
15 FORDFIAm L. Riv. 92, 105 (1946).
43. 3 S. WILLISTON,, CONTRACTS § 532 (3d ed. 1960); Annot., 71 A.L.R. 479(1931).
44. E.g., Traiman v. Rappaport, 41 F.2d 336 (3d Cir. 1930). Theoretically at
least, in deciding whether or not to apply the statute, the court need only consider
whether the performance is unitary and whether the consideration is in a lump sum.
In fact, however, application of these principles has been less than mechanical. First,
it is unclear exactly where the line between severable and unitary contracts should
be drawn. 3 S. WILLISTON, supra note 43, at 764, states that the question of whether
or not a contract is divisible "is one of law, but no formula has been devised which
furnishes an infallible abstract rule for determining what given contracts are severable
and what are entire .. " Second, the courts' characterization of whether a contract
is divisible or not often depends on whether the court wants to apply the Statute
of Frauds. This is especially true with regard to the enforceability of an oral con-
tract to devise land and personalty for services rendered. Even a highly suspect claim
may be hard to disprove. The courts often conclude that (1) the performance alleged
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the court eliminated part of the contract it would, by enforcing the
remainder, be writing a new contract between the parties, one which
they probably never intended. 45 However, these principles should not
preclude the enforcement of an oral sales-service contract if the essence
of the contract is service. First, compliance with the "essence" test
does not require a partial enforcement of the contract. According to
the Dali case, if the contract is essentially one for service it may be
enforced in its entirety, not merely as to its service elements. Such
total enforcement appears justified; if a contract is essentially for
"services," it is not a "sales" contract within the intended scope of
the Statute of Frauds, and the statute should in no way affect it.
Secondly, the consumer often contracts orally for the repair and, if
necessary, the replacement of a major unit such as a furnace or air
conditioning system. The emergency nature of the consumer's needs
may leave no time for the formalities usual in a sales contract. Further-
more, there may be no writing because the parties intended to form,
and thought they had formed, a service contract. It would be in-
equitable to allow either party to repudiate in such a situation by
claiming the protection of the statute.
The theory utilized in Foster, that of applying two bodies of law
to a unified contract, would not adequately resolve the problems pre-
sented by a sales contract which only partially satisfied the Statute
of Frauds. As stated previously, if a court were to partially enforce the
provisions of a contract, it would in effect be creating a new contract,
one to which the parties never agreed. Moreover, the court would
have to determine what proportion of the total consideration was
represented by the enforceable segment of the contract. The fair
market value of that segment would be an unreliable indicator because
it might well be greater than the portion of the purchase price which
was allocated to that segment in the contemplation of the parties.
Indeed, standing by itself, the enforceable segment might have little,
if any, value to the buyer.
The arguments against enforcing only a part of a contract would
require the use of the "essence" test in applying the Statute of Frauds
to a unified contract for the sale of real and personal property. How-
ever, underlying policy considerations relating to memorandum re-
quirements in the conveyance of real estate might demand the applica-
tion of the stricter real property statute in all such cases. Where the
issue is one of warranty, however, severability is the more reasonable
is insufficient as to the real estate, (2) the alleged contract is indivisible, and (3) the
Statute of Frauds makes the entire contract indivisible. E.g., Hamilton v. Thirston,
93 Md. 213, 48 A. 709 (1901) ; Annot., 71 A.L.R. 479 (1931). The courts may also
feel that quantum reruit provides sufficient remedy for the deserving plaintiff. Goodloe
v. Goodloe, 116 Tenn. 252, 92 S.W. 767 (1906).
45. 3 S. WILLIST N, supra note 43, at 764. This rule applies only to executory
contracts. If one party is to render two performances, one within and one outside
the statute, for an executed consideration, there is no reason why the other party may
not waive the performance obligation invalidated by the statute and enforce the contract
as to the other obligation. However, in some states the statute may have the effect of
making a contract in violation of the statute not merely "unenforceable" but "void."
E.g., Hearn v. May, 207 Or. 514, 298 P.2d 177 (1956). Such a statute might com-
pletely invalidate the contract, even when the prohibited act had been fully performed.
Pier v. Clarke, 71 Minn. 114, 73 N.W. 522 (1898).
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solution. Consider a contract for the sale of a farm upon which stands
a silo of wheat. Assume that the value of the wheat was included in the
price of the farm and that both parties realized that an attempt would
be made to market the wheat. Generally no implied warranty attaches
to the sale of real estate,4" but if the contract were severed, an implied
warranty of merchantability could be applied to the wheat. It could
be argued that the same result would be reached by a holding that the
contract was not unitary at all but was really two divisible contracts,
one for the sale of land and one for the sale of goods. There is, how-
ever, no certainty that a court would hold that such a contract is not
unified,4 7 especially if the consideration was in the form of a lump sum.
According to Corbin:
In cases of this sort the courts often call the contract a divisible
contract; but all the facts justify is a statement that the defendant
has promised two performances that can easily be distinguished
by the court by reference to the agreement itself. The contract
is not divisible in the sense that the plaintiff has given or promised
to give a separate and distinct equivalent for each of the two per-
formances promised by the defendant.4"
The analogy theory may have the widest general applicability.
As the Code's solutions to specific problems become more accepted, it
seems likely that the analogy doctrine will also receive a broader
acceptance. The use of the analogy doctrine would both obviate the
difficulty of severing the contract and extend the progressive Code
formulations into appropriate areas which otherwise would be beyond
the scope of the Code. Foster may present a situation where the notice
of resale required by the Code should be applied to the whole contract.
If it was commercially reasonable to expect the plaintiff to satisfy the
notice requirement as to the furnishings, why should he be allowed to
forego giving notice with regard to the studios and real estate? The
Code49 and the common law50 require the seller to conduct the resale in
good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner. The scheme of
the Code suggests that, as to movables, notice of resale is an integral
requirement of a reasonable resale. The notice requirement is appar-
46. Note, Implied Warranties in the Sale of New Houses, 27 MD. L. REv. 299(1967).
47. The courts have found no clear line of division between the entire and
divisible contract. See note 44 supra. Cf. Porter v. Fisher, 4 Cal. Unrep. 324, 34 P.
700 (1893) (Oral contract to collect brokerage fees for sale of land and chattels is
divisible) and Pettigrove v. Corvallis Lumber Mfg. Co., 143 Or. 33, 21 P.2d 198(1933) (Oral contract to collect brokerage fees for sale of land and chattels is entire).
48. 2 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 313 (1950). However, the courts have sometimes
construed what appeared formalistically to be a divisible contract as a unitary con-
tract, if, in their belief, justice so required. Bethea v. Investors Loan Co., 197 A.2d
448 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964) (Contract for the purchase of freezer and for the purchase
of foods at a discount held entire even though separate consideration paid for each.
Divisibility of subject matter and apportionment of purchase price was not conclusive
where (1) parties assented to the contract as a whole, (2) the buyer already owned a
freezer, and (3) the buyer's intent was to purchase the food at a discount).
49. UNIFORM COMM4RCIAL CODg § 2-706(1).
50. 5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRAcTS § 1379B (rev. ed. 1937). At common law, seller's
notice of resale has been held to be optional. Id. at § 1379C. Some states, however
have required such notice. Bell v. Lamborn, 2 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1924) (interpreting
Georgia law); Penn v. Smith, 98 Ala. 560, 12 So. 818 (1893).
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ently based on the common law theory that the resale treats the property
as owned by the buyer and that the sale is on the buyer's account."
As a consequence, the buyer is entitled to an opportunity to protect
his interest and prevent a sacrifice of the property. 2 In the Foster
situation, it would appear that a reasonable resale would require the
sale of all the assets of the radio station as a unit. It is submitted that
the court should have made such a finding and then addressed itself
to the question of whether, on the basis of policy considerations stem-
ming from background law, business practices, and the reasonable ex-
pectations of the parties, the requirement of notice should be imposed as
to any portion of the contract. If the latter question were answered in
the affirmative, the court should then have determined whether there was
any sound reason to distinguish between movables and non-movables.13
In conclusion, there appears to be no one general rule that can be
applied to the dual nature contract. There may be good policy reasons
to apply one particular rule to a certain type of contract, but as soon
as the issue or the subject matter of the contract changes, the policy
reasons may change or entirely disappear. It is not the purpose of this
Note to suggest that the result in Foster is incorrect, although it may
well be, but it is submitted that the court's mechanical approach should
be avoided by courts confronted with problems concerning the applica-
tion of the Code to the dual nature contract.
51. See Green v. Ansley, 92 Ga. 647, 19 S.E. 53 (1893) (notice of resale required
for sale of real estate). In those states requiring notice, and where it was in fact
given, the measure of damages at common law was the difference between the contract
price and the price obtained at the resale. Where the required notice was not given,
the damages were the difference between the market value at the time of breach and
the contract price. With minor changes, these damage rules have also been adopted
by the Code. Compare UNIFORM COMMSRCIAL CODS § 2-706(1) and UNIFORM COM-
MtRCIAL ComE § 2-708(1).
52. Green v. Ansley, 92 Ga. 647, 19 S.E. 53 (1893).
53. The court in Foster was apparently not faced with any binding precedent on
the question.
